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YOU DON’T KNOW MY NAME:
IN RE ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEAKERS
AND THE RIGHT TO REMAIN
CLOAKED IN CYBERSPACE
Joshua Rich*
The right to speak anonymously predates the Constitution, and
the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized it as protected
under the First Amendment. So it was in line with a long
tradition that, in 2007, several anonymous speakers posted
comments on Internet message boards criticizing a business
called Quixtar, which was embroiled in several lawsuits at the
time. Before long, however, the posters’ comments became the
subject of a legal conundrum: did Quixtar’s request to unmask
the unknown authors during discovery outweigh the authors’
First Amendment right to remain cloaked? In ultimately
answering that question, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court’s decision to reveal some, but not all, of the authors’
identities. And while the case, In re Anonymous Online Speakers,
was one of first impression for the Ninth Circuit—in that it
involved anonymous nonparty online postings where the speech
was commercial in nature—the court failed to clarify the law in
this area. This Comment examines the court’s ruling and argues
that while the Ninth Circuit took a good step forward in the
discussion of anonymous speech on the Internet, a great leap
forward would have been better.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; A.B., May 1998,
University of Michigan. This Comment would not have been possible without the guidance and
editorial judgment of Professor Gary Williams, Milena Shtelmakher, Elena DeCoste Grieco,
Megan Weisgerber, Blythe Golay, Edith Nazarian, Alicia Bower, and all of the dedicated
members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. My legal trajectory would not have been
possible without the support of Dean Rebekah Hanley, Professor Jennifer Reynolds, and the
entire University of Oregon School of Law community. And everything else would not have been
possible without the love of my parents, Harvey Rich and Jane Rich; my brother, Aaron Rich; and
my wife, Erica Rich—who, it seems, wound up marrying a lawyer, after all.
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I. INTRODUCTION
They called themselves “Publius.”1 The Founding Fathers who
campaigned for the ratification of the Constitution wrote the
Federalist Papers like many political and social commentators
before them had: anonymously.2 Their method was so successful that
their opponents, the Anti-Federalists, penned pseudonymous screeds
in response.3 And critics of all stripes have regularly repeated the
process of publishing anonymously—a right that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized as protected under the First
Amendment4—in the centuries since.5
So it was in line with a great tradition that several anonymous
speakers posted comments on Internet message boards in 2007,
criticizing a business called Quixtar, otherwise known as the
celebrated sales firm Amway.6 Coinciding with several lawsuits
involving Quixtar and some of its former employees, the posters’
anonymous comments soon became the subject of a legal
conundrum: did Quixtar’s request to unmask the unknown authors
during discovery outweigh their First Amendment right to remain
cloaked?7 The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada
determined that some, but not all, of the anonymous speakers’
identities should be revealed.8 And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld that decision when it reviewed the parties’
respective petitions for writs of mandamus.9
For the Ninth Circuit, the case was one of first impression, in
that it boasted a fact pattern involving anonymous nonparty online

1. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *5
(9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011).
2. Id.; Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 836 (2010).
3. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 836.
4. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487.
6. Id. at *1–2.
7. See id. at *2.
8. Id. at *4–5.
9. Id. at *21.
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postings where the speech was commercial in nature.10 Few other
federal appeals courts have encountered such a scenario,11 and the
rules guiding a court’s balancing of anonymous speech with
discovery requests are muddled.12 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit did
not clarify the law in this arena.
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re
Anonymous Online Speakers13 took a good step forward in the
discussion of anonymous speech on the Internet, but that it should
have gone further. Part II sets forth the facts of the case, and Part III
examines the court’s reasoning. Part IV then demonstrates that the
right to speak anonymously is firmly rooted in the American
political, social, and legal mind. It goes on to assert that as the
Internet becomes a surrogate for the town square, and as lawsuits
regarding anonymous speech in cyberspace grow in number, courts
like the Ninth Circuit should set forth clear rules governing online
conduct. Their failure to do so risks unmasking anonymous speakers
and excluding them from a key forum of contemporary democracy.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Signature Management TEAM (“TEAM”) and Quixtar were two
companies that started as close collaborators but wound up as fierce
rivals in litigation.14 Quixtar was a successor to Amway, the famous
direct-selling firm.15 It distributed a wide array of products like
cosmetics and nutritional supplements to consumers via individual
contractors known as “Independent Business Operators,” or IBOs.16
While working for Quixtar, two IBOs founded TEAM, a businesstraining firm that sold motivational guides and educational programs
to other Quixtar IBOs.17
10. Id. at *11. The court initially issued an opinion that addressed the commercial nature of
the anonymous commentators’ speech. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653, 661
(9th Cir. 2010), withdrawn and superseded by No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487 (9th
Cir. Jan. 7, 2011). But it later withdrew that opinion and replaced it with one that sidestepped the
commercial speech issue. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *17–19.
Therefore, this Comment will not address the knotty commercial speech doctrine in detail.
11. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 54–61 and accompanying text.
13. No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011).
14. Id. at *3.
15. Id. at *1–2.
16. Id. at *2–3.
17. Id. at *3.
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But a dispute arose in August 2007 when Quixtar fired the two
TEAM founders.18 As IBOs, the pair had signed contracts that
included post-termination, non-compete, and non-solicitation
clauses.19 Thus, their departure from Quixtar, coupled with their
ongoing work for TEAM, led to a disagreement over whether they
were complying with their IBO contracts and whether the contracts
were enforceable at all.20 The TEAM founders joined a class action
against Quixtar, and a protracted and heated series of lawsuits
between Quixtar and TEAM arose around the country.21
In the case that eventually made its way to the Ninth Circuit—
Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Management TEAM, LLC22—Quixtar sued
TEAM for tortious interference, claiming that TEAM disrupted
Quixtar’s existing business contracts and advantageous relations.23
Quixtar asserted that TEAM had engaged in an Internet smear
campaign to encourage remaining Quixtar IBOs to leave Quixtar and
join a rival company that was affiliated with TEAM.24
Several anonymous Internet postings illustrated its claim,
Quixtar argued.25 The statements appeared on many different online
sources, including blogs called Save Us Dick DeVos, Q’Reilly,
Integrity Is TEAM, and IBO Rebellion, as well as a video titled
Hooded Angry Man.26 The anonymous comments were consistently
critical of Quixtar’s business and employment practices, with such
postings as “Quixtar has regularly, but secretly, acknowledged that
its products are overpriced and not sellable”; “Quixtar refused to pay
bonuses to IBOs in good standing”; “[Quixtar] terminated IBOs
without due process”; “Quixtar currently suffers from systemic
dishonesty”; and “Quixtar is aware of, approves, promotes, and
facilitates the systematic noncompliance with the FTC’s Amway
rules.”27

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
566 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D. Nev. 2008).
Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
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Quixtar believed that the anonymous speakers were “TEAM
officers, employees, or agents”28 and sought to uncover their
identities during discovery.29 It deposed TEAM’s online content
manager, Benjamin Dickie, asking him to identify the speakers, but
Dickie refused.30 As a result, Quixtar filed a motion to compel him
“to testify regarding his knowledge of the authors” of the anonymous
comments from the five aforementioned online sources.31
The district court granted the motion in part, ordering Dickie to
reveal the identities of the speakers from three of the sources.32
Consequently, the people behind those statements—the “Anonymous
Online Speakers”—tried to block Dickie’s testimony by filing a
petition for a writ of mandamus with the Ninth Circuit.33 Quixtar
opposed that petition and sought its own writ of mandamus,
demanding that Dickie reveal the identities of the speakers from the
two remaining blogs.34 Therefore, the issue on appeal was whether to
grant the parties’ respective petitions and thereby either protect or
further unmask the Anonymous Online Speakers.35
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Ninth Circuit denied both parties’ petitions, reasoning that
neither side had shown that it was entitled to relief via a writ of
mandamus36—an “‘extraordinary’ remedy limited to ‘extraordinary’
causes.”37 Indeed, the court made clear that while an appeals court’s
mandamus power is ultimately “discretionary,”38 it is limited in the
discovery context, where deference to trial court rulings is high.39
Still, the court added, “[W]e have exercised mandamus jurisdiction
to review discovery orders raising particularly important questions of
28. Id.
29. Id. at *2.
30. Id. at *2–4.
31. Id. at *4.
32. Id. at *4–5.
33. Id. at *5.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at *21–22.
37. Id. at *8 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 408 F.3d 1142,
1146 (9th Cir. 2005)).
38. See id. at *9.
39. Id. at *8.
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first impression, especially when called upon to define the scope of
an important privilege.”40
Thus, before it denied the parties’ petitions, the court attempted
to define the scope of a speaker’s right to maintain his or her
anonymity on the Internet.41 In doing so, it addressed two concerns:
(1) the nature of the speech at issue, and (2) the standards that courts
apply in balancing discovery with the First Amendment right to
anonymous speech.42
First, the Ninth Circuit catalogued different types of speech.43 It
made clear that anonymous speech has long enjoyed First
Amendment protection,44 and that the U.S. Supreme Court
recognizes that the First Amendment covers a speaker’s decision to
remain anonymous.45 Moreover, the court reasoned that “online
speech stands on the same footing as other speech—there is ‘no basis
for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied’ to online speech.”46 Accordingly, the court noted that
anonymous speech on the Internet has significant social value:47 it
“promotes the robust exchange of ideas and allows individuals to
express themselves freely without ‘fear of economic or official
retaliation . . . [or] concern about social ostracism.’”48
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that there are at least
some limits on any right to speak, and that courts determine the
degree of protection that a particular statement deserves “depending
on the circumstances and the type of speech at issue.”49 In sum,
political speech usually merits great protection, commercial speech
gets limited protection, and so-called fighting words and obscenity

40. Id. (quoting Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010)).
41. See id. at *5–21.
42. See id. at *5–17.
43. Id. at *6–7.
44. Id. at *5–6.
45. Id.; see infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
46. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *6 (quoting Reno v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
47. See id.
48. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334,
341–42 (1995)).
49. Id.
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boast no First Amendment shield.50 But the court stopped short of
categorizing the speech at issue in this case because the distinction
had no bearing on its ruling.51
Second, the Ninth Circuit sought to apply a standard that
appropriately balanced discovery with the right to speak
anonymously.52 This case offered a matter of first impression for the
Ninth Circuit.53 In fact, only two other circuits had dealt with
analogous fact patterns, but in both cases the courts “declined to
establish or follow any particular standard.”54 Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that several state and federal district courts
had dealt with this issue and applied a variety of standards—from
very low thresholds for disclosing the identities of anonymous
speakers55 to somewhat stricter standards56 to high bars57 to no
standards at all.58
Turning to the district court’s decision in Quixtar, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the lower court used “the most exacting standard,
established by the Delaware Supreme Court in Doe v. Cahill.”59 In
the Cahill case, involving political speech, the court required the
plaintiff “to be able to survive a hypothetical motion for summary
judgment and give, or attempt to give, notice to the speaker before
discovering the anonymous speaker’s identity.”60 The court did so
50. Id. at *7. The First Amendment also does not absolutely protect defamation. RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, 3 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 23:1 (2011), available at Westlaw
FREESPEECH.
51. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *18–19.
52. Id. at *10–17.
53. Id. at *11.
54. Id. at *11–12 (citing Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240 (4th Cir.
2009); NLRB v. Midland Daily News, 151 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1998)).
55. Id. at *14 (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999))
(“The lowest bar that courts have used is the motion to dismiss or good faith standard.”).
56. Id. (citing Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008); Highfields Capital
Mgmt. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326
F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)) (“A number of courts have required plaintiffs to make at least a
prima facie showing of the claim for which the plaintiff seeks the disclosure of the anonymous
speaker’s identity.”).
57. Id. at *15 (citing Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005)).
58. Id. at *13–14 (citing Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev., Inc.,
2006 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 1, rev’d, Klehr v. JPA Dev., 898 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2006)) (“[A] few courts have declined to adopt a new or different standard to accommodate
anonymous speech.”).
59. Id. at *15 (citing Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460).
60. Id.
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because of a concern “that setting the standard too low will chill
potential posters from exercising their First Amendment right to
speak anonymously.”61
Even though it let the district court’s order stand, the Ninth
Circuit determined that “[i]n the context of the speech at issue here
balanced against a discretionary discovery order . . . Cahill’s bar
extends too far.”62 It reasoned that “the nature of the speech should
be a driving force in choosing a standard by which to balance the
rights of anonymous speakers in discovery disputes.”63 Therefore,
because the Anonymous Online Speakers’ comments amounted to
something less than the political speech at issue in Cahill, the court
did not believe that their comments deserved such strong
protection.64
However, referring to its assertion that trial-court-discovery
rulings warrant great deference,65 the Ninth Circuit did not overturn
the district court’s decision to use a high bar for disclosure because
the district court did not clearly err in its order.66 Thus, it charged the
district court with crafting procedures for revealing the Anonymous
Online Speakers’ identities; it noted that a safeguard like a protective
order that mandates disclosure for “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” is
appropriate in such a potentially sensitive First Amendment case.67
The court reached that conclusion after it observed that the district
court had correctly balanced the relative merits of discovery and
protected anonymous speech; the lower court had also acknowledged
that there is “‘great potential for irresponsible, malicious, and
harmful communication’ and that particularly in the age of the

61. Id. at *16 (quoting Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457).
62. Id. at *17.
63. Id. at *18 (“For example, in discovery disputes involving the identity of anonymous
speakers, the notion that commercial speech should be afforded less protection than political,
religious, or literary speech is hardly a novel principle. The specific circumstances surrounding
the speech serve to give context to the balancing exercise.” (citation omitted)). It is also worth
noting that even political speech is not always protected; defamation against a political figure is
not covered by the First Amendment if the speaker acted with actual malice. See SMOLLA, supra
note 50, § 23:3.
64. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *17–18. Besides, the Ninth
Circuit is not obligated to follow Delaware Supreme Court precedent.
65. Id. at *19.
66. Id. at *18–19.
67. Id. at *19–20.
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Internet, the ‘speed and power of internet technology makes it
difficult for the truth to “catch up” to the lie.’”68
IV. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Anonymous Online
Speakers was a solid first step toward clarifying the rules that govern
speech on the Internet. In balancing the speakers’ First Amendment
right against the plaintiff’s discovery right, the court appropriately
allowed a standard that favored free speech69—even though the court
did not necessarily believe that this case warranted such a strong
protection.70 But in leaving open the possibility that future jurists
might choose a less stringent standard,71 the court missed an
opportunity to blaze a broader trail through what it recognized as a
relatively uncharted area of the law: “the First Amendment claims of
an anonymous, non-party speaker on the Internet in the context of
commercial contractual relationships.”72 Considering the constant
growth of the Internet and its increasing importance in the social and
commercial arenas, establishing the firmest possible rules governing
online speech should be a priority. Indeed, although the Ninth
Circuit’s decision here was a solid first step, a solid first leap would
have been better.
The right to speak freely and anonymously is deeply ingrained
in the American social and political mind. In the years leading up to
independence, some colonists departed from their town squares,
opting instead to vent their political frustrations and sway public
opinion through books and essays that they published under

68. Id. at *17 (quoting Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. TEAM, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205,
1214 (D. Nev. 2008)).
69. Id. at *16.
70. Id. at *17–18.
71. Indeed, less than four months after the Ninth Circuit issued its Anonymous Online
Speakers opinion, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada applied a lower standard in a
decision involving a similar fact pattern. Fodor v. Doe, 3:10-CV-0798-RCJ (VPC), 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 49672, at *9 (D. Nev. Apr. 27, 2011) (“Although the Ninth Circuit examined . . .
four approaches to anonymous online speech, it did not adopt a single standard to guide lower
courts. Therefore, this court has considered the various approaches to this unique issue and the
specific facts of this case, and concludes that the prima facie standard . . . is appropriate in this
instance.” (citation omitted)).
72. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *11.
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pseudonyms.73 Thomas Paine’s Common Sense pamphlet, which is
widely regarded as providing the main literary spark for the
American Revolution,74 originally appeared under the signature of
“An Englishman.”75 In fact, the Framers drafted the First
Amendment in part as a response to English laws that silenced
government criticism by requiring that all authors disclose their
identities.76
Nearly two hundred years later, the Supreme Court first
recognized the right to anonymous speech in its 1960 decision Talley
v. California.77 There, the Court voided a Los Angeles city ordinance
that banned the distribution of anonymous handbills.78 In doing so,
the Court reasoned that “identification and fear of reprisal might
deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of
importance.”79 During the following half-century, the Court upheld
the First Amendment protection of anonymous speech in successive
decisions that generally dealt with political speech80: McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission,81 Buckley v. American Constitutional
Law Foundation,82 and Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village
of Stratton.83 Now, one could reasonably argue that this issue is
settled law.
Apparently settled, too, is the notion that First Amendment
protections extend to the Internet. The Court recognized this in its
1997 opinion Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.84 There, in
striking down provisions of the Communications Decency Act of
1996, which sought to protect minors from exposure to indecent

73. Jennifer B. Wieland, Note, Death of Publius: Toward a World Without Anonymous
Speech, 17 J.L. & POL. 589, 591 (2001). Celebrated examples include mid-18th century works by
“Cato” and “Junius”; the latter’s identity is still not known. Id.
74. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 78–79 (David R.
Zarowin ed., 1990).
75. Wieland, supra note 73, at 591–92.
76. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 836–37.
77. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
78. Id. at 65.
79. Id.
80. See Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 837–38.
81. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
82. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
83. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
84. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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materials online,85 the majority of the Court86 noted that “the growth
of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal.”87 Given
that context, the majority went on to reason that “governmental
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the
free exchange of ideas than to encourage it,” and that “encouraging
freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any
theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”88
Nevertheless, the right to speak anonymously—whether online
or in the public square—is not absolute.89 As with harmful speech in
other contexts, plaintiffs may seek redress against defendants whose
anonymous words have injured them.90 This ability takes on
particular importance in the online world, where federal law
immunizes Internet service providers, or ISPs, from suits regarding
speech transmitted over their systems.91 Thus, plaintiffs must sue
speakers directly—a process that often involves serving ISPs with
subpoenas that seek the speakers’ identities.92 Consequently, courts
often encounter discovery motions to reveal the identities of people
who do not know that their anonymity is in jeopardy, especially if
they are not parties to the underlying action.93 But there is no clear
standard for unmasking such speakers.94
In determining whether to reveal the identity of an unnamed
online speaker, courts tend to balance the plaintiff’s interest in
seeking compensation against the defendant’s interest in exercising
the First Amendment right to anonymity.95 Courts do not agree,
however, on how to do that balancing.96 As a result, various
jurisdictions have developed similar but inconsistent standards for
85. Id. at 858–59.
86. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, which six other members joined, while
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurred in part and dissented in part. Id.
at 848.
87. Id. at 885.
88. Id.
89. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 839.
90. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 352–53 (1995).
91. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
92. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 842.
93. Id. at 843.
94. See id. at 835.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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plaintiffs to meet before unmasking their opponents.97 For the most
part, such inquiries have occurred in state and federal district courts;
before In re Anonymous Online Speakers, for instance, only two
federal appeals courts had addressed the issue, and neither followed a
particular standard.98
Unfortunately, while the Ninth Circuit reached an appropriate
conclusion in In re Anonymous Online Speakers, it should have
applied a clearer standard for determining when to unmask an
anonymous online speaker. Instead, it simply let stand the district
court’s adoption of the Cahill test, even though it acknowledged that
it did not fully agree with the district court’s application of that test.99
Such a holding is problematic because of two simultaneous
developments: (1) communication in cyberspace is increasingly
becoming a primary means of discourse in society, and (2)
anonymous speech on the Internet is notably prevalent.100
Meanwhile, lawsuits dealing with anonymous online users have been
on the rise since the Internet became popular in the 1990s.101 Thus,
while this may have been a case of first impression for the Ninth
Circuit, it is unlikely the last such case that the court will encounter.
Complicating matters is the fact that the legal system has
struggled with this issue from the start. At first, courts appeared to
lack interest in protecting anonymity on the Internet.102 Plaintiffs
tended to be large businesses while defendants were lone
individuals.103 ISPs often disclosed identities without even telling the
speakers that their covers had been blown.104 Commonly, such
97. Id. at 835, 846; see also supra text accompanying notes 54–61 (showing that courts
employ a range of standards when they decide whether to unmask anonymous speakers). In his
note, Matthew Mazzotta offers an “Appendix of Unmasking Standards,” which details ten
different balancing tests that state and federal trial courts use in such situations. Mazzotta, supra
note 2, at 866–69. With some exceptions, most of those standards roughly resemble the Cahill
test. See supra text accompanying note 60.
98. See supra text accompanying note 54.
99. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *17–
19 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011).
100. See id. at *6.
101. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 844.
102. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John Doe?,
50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2009).
103. Id. To be sure, drawing special attention were “strategic lawsuits against public
participation,” or “SLAPP suits,” where corporations sought to censor criticism by drowning
defendants in expensive litigation. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 844.
104. Lidsky, supra note 102, at 1374.
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revelations occurred during discovery, a pretrial step that merely
requires that plaintiffs have cognizable claims.105 Worse, judges
regularly showed themselves to be ignorant of basic aspects of the
Internet.106 Thus, commentators started to fear that such scenarios
could cause a chilling effect on anonymous speech in cyberspace.107
Indeed, such a cold wind could cause damage far beyond the
Internet. Because the online universe is fast replacing the town
squares and newspapers in which people like “Publius” once
presented their platforms,108 any censorship thereon effectively
prevents complete participation in contemporary democracy.
Something so vital to our social and political dialogue demands
concrete governance.
Not all of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion merits criticism, however.
The court took important strides toward fleshing out the issue of
anonymous online speech and cataloguing the various standards that
courts employ while balancing plaintiffs’ and defendants’ respective
rights in this arena.109 It correctly noted that not all online speech is
protectable, given the speed and reach of the Internet, where
“harmful communication” is very possible.110 It aptly implied that
discovery requests often do have great merit,111 especially when cases
cannot proceed unless the plaintiff knows who was responsible for
the speech at issue.112 And it wisely suggested that in situations
where an anonymous online speaker’s identity is uncovered, the
unmasking should be done with safeguards that limit the revelation

105. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 834.
106. Lidsky, supra note 102, at 1374. Jurists’ general lack of technological expertise also
encourages clearer rules to guide them in cases arising in cyberspace. Although the Supreme
Court has generally extended traditional First Amendment rights into cyberspace, see Reno v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), reports of the Justices’ failure to understand the
basics of electronics abound, see, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Get Personal over Privacy of
Messages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at A12 (describing some Justices’ confusion regarding
how text messaging and pagers work).
107. Lidsky, supra note 102, at 1374.
108. Indeed, today the Internet provides the central public forum where many people exercise
their free speech right. See Stacey D. Schesser, Comment, A New Domain for Public Speech:
Opening Public Spaces Online, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1791, 1795–96 (2006).
109. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *10–
18 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011).
110. Id. at *17.
111. See id.
112. Mazzotta, supra note 2, at 834.
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to only interested parties.113 Unfortunately, critics and courts looking
to the Ninth Circuit for guidance on this matter may reasonably
argue that this line of reasoning was merely dicta.114 Therefore, a
more reliable holding is necessary to prevent future confusion.
What, then, should such a rule look like? Certainly, anonymous
and pseudonymous speech should receive strong protection on the
Internet, just as it is strongly protected elsewhere. Accordingly, the
Cahill standard is a good guide because it strives to set a high bar for
unmasking anonymous speakers. But perhaps an even stronger
standard would not focus on whether the plaintiff could survive a
summary judgment motion or on the type of speech at issue. Rather,
it might zero in on the actual harm that the anonymous person’s
speech caused. One of the basic elements of any libel claim is that
the plaintiff suffered some reputational harm as a result of the
defendant’s statement.115 So it makes sense to bring the anonymous
online speech doctrine in line with that of libel. The result would be
great protection of anonymous speech, but it would not come at the
expense of plaintiffs who actually suffer from the words at issue.
Therefore, in In re Anonymous Online Speakers, Quixtar would
only be able to unmask the Anonymous Online Speakers if it could
prove that it suffered actual harm as a result of their statements. The
plaintiff would have a potential remedy and innocuous anonymous
speech would run even less risk of being chilled. As more cases like
this one arise, such policy rationales call for a clearer rule on when to
unmask anonymous speakers in cyberspace.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in In re Anonymous Online
Speakers was a significant step in the ever-expanding legal area of
anonymous speech on the Internet.116 But the court should have done
more. Standards that courts apply in cases where they must balance
plaintiffs’ discovery requests against defendants’ First Amendment
113. Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *19–20.
114. In its holding, the court simply denied the parties’ respective petitions for writs of
mandamus. Id. at *21.
115. See SMOLLA, supra note 50, § 23:1.
116. See generally Jason A. Martin et al., Anonymous Speakers and Confidential Sources:
Using Shield Laws When They Overlap Online, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 89 (2011) (seeking to
untangle the thorny issues that have arisen in the Internet age involving online anonymity and
news organizations’ confidential sources).
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right to anonymous speech still need clarification. Judges must
develop an even greater understanding of—and sensitivity to—legal
issues arising in cyberspace. And participation in discourse on the
Internet, the town square of today, cannot be curtailed. As a result,
courts’ failure to establish firmer and clearer rules regarding
anonymous online speech risks not only the unmasking of unnamed
Internet denizens—it risks cutting off a substantial portion of the
populace from contemporary democracy.
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